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The non-entrepreneurial and anti-entrepreneurial nature of organised crime: theoretical issues and policy implications

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The non-entrepreneurial and anti-entrepreneurial nature of organised crime: theoretical issues and policy implications

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Abstract. Intuitively, crime and entrepreneurship are radically opposed in desirability and empirical effects. Yet, recent research has deliberately chosen to go beyond certain obvious facts, creating — instead of resolving — theoretical and practical problems. To discuss the limitations of what can be called the “criminal-entrepreneurial” model, this paper pays particular attention to the concept of economic agents developed by the Austrian school of economics, which has extensively theorised and defended the role of entrepreneurship in market systems. From the Austrian school’s perspective, the crucial role of economic freedoms and individual liberty assumes greater importance when discussing socio-economic processes. These aspects are crucially important for organised crime research but are not sufficiently underlined in most of the current literature. On these premises, enterprising and criminal actions are distinguished on the basis of four general characteristics (i.e., competition, alertness, uncertainty, creativity). Findings show how, by taking enterprising agents (rather than rational agents) more seriously, organised crime and entrepreneurship are not only sharply different but profoundly incompatible.

Keywords: organised crime, entrepreneurship, economic liberties, rule of law, Austrian school of economics.

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1. Introduction

Working under the pressure of organised crime is particularly arduous for entrepreneurs. Surprisingly, it is often assumed that organised crime is, in its own way, a form of entrepreneurship. It often is believed that organised crime works essentially like a firm (Wright, 2006), that illicit activities are carried out on a *continuum* with licit activities (Hagan, 1983; Edwards and Gill, 2002) and that criminal and entrepreneurial activities are simply on different sides of the same economic *spectrum* (Smith, 1980).¹ In this context, the power of organised crime is described more in relation to its ability to make money than in its capacity to coerce. Organised crime studies often speak of “mafia *entrepreneurs*”, “collusive *entrepreneurs*”, “illicit *enterprises*”, “criminal *entrepreneurship*”, “violent *entrepreneurs*”, etc.² But how can criminal practices like corruption, money laundering and illegal trafficking be considered entrepreneurial?

The possibility to opt for less overtly violent acts (e.g., extortion, usury, racketeering) has suggested that organised crime can change its skin and be characterised more by competition than collusion (Reuter, 1983). Even when authors acknowledge that legitimate businesses do not resort to extra-legal sanctions to address

¹ The spectrum-based theory of enterprise in organised crime has been proposed by Dwight C. Smith (1975, 1976, 1980) and further developed in other studies (Edwards and Gill, 2002; Solari, 2007; Savona and Berlusconi, 2015; Mallon and Fainshmidt, 2022). For the general debate, see also Yeager (1976).

² For the study of mafia-types of organisations, Arlacchi (1979, 1983/1986, 2007) emphatically suggests a shift from the “man of honour” to the “mafia entrepreneur” or the “entrepreneur with a Kalashnikov” (see also Wright, 2006; Edelbacher et al., 2016; Champeyrache, 2018, 2024).

market competition (Wright, 2006: 190), it is too often suggested that *all* businesses (including legitimate businesses) are “not adverse to corruption” (Gottschalk, 2009: 98). Furthermore, “That entrepreneurs and customers occasionally behave legally and occasionally behave illegally needs little proof; that motivation, opportunity, and critical factors in that choice of behavior are also beyond argument” (Smith, 1980: 381).

These interpretations may depend on the (implicit or explicit) idea of *homo economicus* typical of neoclassical economics, by which all economic agents are seen as nothing more than utility maximisers.³ They converge in what may be called the “criminal-entrepreneurial” model, which has become the dominant interpretative framework in most recent research on organised crime.⁴ It is beyond reasonable doubt that entrepreneurship is a highly desirable, vital activity for societal development, while organised crime is not.⁵ Failing to acknowledge certain substantial differences has created odd situations in which true entrepreneurs are referred to as *non-mafiosi* entrepreneurs, *non-criminal* entrepreneurs or *honest* entrepreneurs (usually with

³ When co-opted firms are labelled as “mafia-owned legal enterprises”, “shield enterprises”, etc., the scholarship risks depicting certain processes more like partnerships than practices of subordination. Compare Faldetta and Provenzano (2016: 49), Champeyrache (2018: 159) and Bertolin and Chiodelli (2023).

⁴ See in, for instance, applied economics (Schelling, 1971; Reuter, 1983), business and public administration (Vander Beken and Van Daele, 2008; Canonico et al., 2012), criminal justice and law (Hagan, 1983), entrepreneurship studies (Smith, 2009; 2016), human geography (Champeyrache, 2018), management and organisation sciences (Southerland and Potter, 1993), political sciences (Lindesmith, 1941; Sellin, 1963) and sociology (Light, 1977).

⁵ Some authors have returned to this once obvious point (Baumol, 2003; McCaffrey, 2018). It is not always clear whether Baumol (1990) conceives organised crime as a form of unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship (Mehlum et al., 2003; Sutter et al., 2013; Ashby, 2015; La Rosa et al., 2018; Ferrante et al., 2021).

quotation marks), even if entrepreneurs remain the principal victims of criminal organisations.⁶ At this point, are there reasons to believe that the criminal-entrepreneurial model creates more problems than it resolves? If this is the case, then more conceptual rigour is required.

This paper argues that there should be more neutral and adequate ways to understand negative phenomena (e.g., criminal economies) and positive phenomena (genuine market economies). The impression is that organised crime scholarship uses entrepreneurial models without paying too much attention to what an *enterprising* agent (rather than a merely rational agent) actually is.

To discuss these limitations, this paper pays particular attention to the concept of economic agents developed by the Austrian school of economics, which has extensively theorised and defended the role of entrepreneurs in society in an attempt to revise the neoclassical view. As regards the role of the state, the focus will mainly be on those Austrian scholars accepting a classical-liberal view.

This paper emphasises how the differences between genuine entrepreneurs and alleged ones become urgent in organised crime research. In terms of methodology, it is based on an extensive critical review of organised crime and entrepreneurship literature and on the analysis of empirical data and information from official documents, reports and repositories.⁷

⁶ See in particular Kleemans (2013: 624-625), Sutter et al. (2013), Vaccaro and Palazzo (2015), Vorley and Williams (2016), La Rosa et al. (2018), Guerci et al. (2021) and Mallon and Fainshmidt (2022).

⁷ For example, the latest data from the World Bank (2020), Global Organized Crime Index (2023) and Freedom House (2024); further information from the ARIEL project (Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of Organised

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces some preliminary specifications on certain characteristics of organised crime. Section 3 defines the theoretical framework more sharply, distinguishing entrepreneurial and criminal actions. Section 4 discusses the theoretical and policy implications of taking this distinction more seriously. Section 5 concludes by highlighting the main findings, limitations and possible developments of the research.

2. Preliminary specifications

Before entering into the main discussion, some preliminary issues should be highlighted. There is a wide debate on how to define organised crime, but official classifications are still lacking (Edelbacher et al., 2016: 102). However, it seems possible to converge on some basic criteria describing organised crime as a *collective* of individuals (comprising at least two or three persons) engaging in the coordination of *illicit* activities (typically involving the application of violence) and doing so to the *detriment* of others (e.g., civil society).⁸

Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies), Savona and Berlusconi (2015), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2026), the Human Freedom Index (Vásquez et al., 2023) and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

⁸ See, for instance, current definitions of organised crime provided by the United Nations as a “criminal enterprise” (UNODC, 2004) and in other studies (Block, 1980; Scandizzo and Ventura, 2015: 121; Guerci et al., 2021: 3). For the more general debate, see also Hagan (1983), Edwards and Gill (2002), Finckenauer (2005) and Buscaglia (2008a).

Obviously, definitional challenges differ depending on the specific traits of certain criminal organisations (e.g., cartels, gangs, mafia-type groups), but comprehensive definitions are nevertheless necessary and practicable. It is furthermore necessary to recognise two methodological issues. First, organised crime is an *obscure* phenomenon (in a non-metaphorical sense). In this case, information is largely unrecorded and incomplete (e.g., informal transactions), and available data are often not readily accessible.⁹ Second, organised crime operates *outside* established norms, acting against many socially accepted precepts (e.g., moral, legal, technical). Many elements may impede a full assessment of organised crime issues (Sutter et al., 2013; Nicati and Daams, 2016); when dealing with grey areas, it is inevitable to encounter some simplifications.

This paper proposes considering *illegality* and *violence* as invariances to any type of criminal organisation. In other words, illegality and violence are *constitutive elements* structuring power within organised crime (internally and externally). This specification aims to distinguish organised crime from other (more or less similar) kinds of rent-seeking activities.¹⁰ As we will see later, the notion of legality is accepted

⁹ Examples of less accessible qualitative information can be court proceedings, police and intelligence investigations and judiciary sources (Canonico et al., 2012; Faldetta and Provenzano, 2016; Opassina, 2018; Chiodelli, 2019; Bertolin and Chiodelli, 2023). For quantitative information (including extensive surveys or mapping and analysis of geo-statistical and socio-economic data), there are often problems with unhomogenised sources (Savona and Berlusconi, 2015; FATF, 2016; Luca and Proietti, 2022).

¹⁰ For Gottschalk (2009), rent-seeking behaviour is “almost a constant” for organised crime groups. See also Wright (2006), Ashby (2015) and Ferrante et al. (2021). For a wider discussion on rent-seeking, compare with Buchanan et al. (1980), Morck and Reung (2004) and Murphy et al. (2008). For a stimulating discussion on violence and social order, see North et al. (2009).

here not in a formalistic sense but as compliance with the law of a classical liberal-democracy.

3. Theoretical framework

One of the main critics of the criminal-entrepreneurial model, Liddick (1999), suggests avoiding stressing similarities between legal and illegal businesses:

[the] enterprise framework only suggests that legal and illegal businesses are similar [...]; attractive as that approach may be, it may be more appropriate to recognize that fundamental differences exist between legal and illegal businesses. [...] Illegal enterprises are not the formal, complex, rational entities found at the legal end of the market spectrum [...]. The danger lies in theorists' predilection for interpreting and shaping events in familiar terms. (Liddick, 1999: 427-429)

Nevertheless, he hesitates to abandon a certain view entirely:

numerous theories of formal organizations and markets have not been utilized to examine organized crime. Until other applications of the enterprise framework are explored, let us not "throw out the baby with the bathwater". (Liddick, 1999: 427-429)

Other scholars remark that similarities between organised crime and entrepreneurship may be, at the very least, overstated (Masciandaro, 2000), mainly "because organized crime pursues objectives far beyond mere business interests" (McCarthy, 2011: 21). Evidently, certain research perspectives on organised crime are under theorised (Liddick, 1999; Kleemans, 2013: 616).

The problem is not that older or pure economic theories are insufficient; it all depends on the kind of focus one adopts. In organised crime studies, famous Austrian

economists like von Mises (1947, 1949, 1951), Lachmann (1948, 1986), von Hayek (1948, 1960, 1982), and Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1997) remain strangely neglected.¹¹

3.1. *The Austrian school perspective on entrepreneurship*

From the Austrian school's perspective, the crucial role of economic freedoms and individual liberty assumes greater importance when discussing socio-economic processes. The impression is that the criminal-entrepreneurial model attributes too much rationality to entrepreneurs and too little to organised criminals, while it should be the opposite. Following the suggestions of Southerland and Potter (1999) and Kleemans (2013), organised crime is a special case of an incumbent, rational, centralised and exploitative entity that uses the visible hand of violence to prevail over enterprising persons. These aspects are crucially important for organised crime studies but are not sufficiently underlined in the majority of the current literature.¹² In Hayekian terms, organised crime imposes *taxis* over *cosmos* (von Hayek, 1982).

According to Lachman (1948), entrepreneurs invent not by extending control (e.g., to the whole production plan) but by their ability to regroup resources (e.g., from discarded or revised plans). According to Kirzner (1997: 72),

¹¹ With a few notable exceptions: Backhaus (1979), Buscaglia (2008a, 2008b), Smith (2009), Ashby (2015) and Vorley and Williams (2016).

¹² Based on the latest estimations, 82.7% of the global population lives in countries with high criminality (+ 4% from 2021). Full democracies have higher resilience to organised crime than authoritarian states; nevertheless, "free countries" also rank high in the Global Organised Crime Index (2023). Compare this with Vásquez et al. (2023) and Freedom House, 2024). See also Table 2 in § 4 and Table C in the Annex.

The entrepreneurial character of human action refers not simply to the circumstance that action is taken in an open-ended, uncertain world, but also to the circumstance that the human agent is at all times spontaneously on the lookout for hitherto unnoticed features of the environment (present or future), which might inspire new activity on his part.

Similarly, von Hayek (1982: 76) writes,

Competition is as much a method for breeding certain types of mind as anything else: the very cast of thinking of the great entrepreneurs would not exist but for the environment in which they developed their gifts.

In terms of firms, entrepreneurial business is characterised by a self-conscious design (Langlois, 2007) that largely depends on the creative spirit living inside the entrepreneur who, in the words of von Mises, “innovates necessarily”:

It could not conceivably be relieved of this burden. If it were it would cease to be a pioneer. Progress cannot be organized. (von Mises, 1951: 189)

Austrian economists have never specifically addressed organised crime as intended here; however, they provide some indirect insights to discuss in more original and constructive ways the radical difference between enterprising and criminal agents.

3.2. Four characteristics distinguishing enterprising from criminal actions

Four general characteristics distinguish enterprising vs criminal actions are the following: (§ 3.2.1.) *competition*, (§ 3.2.2.) *alertness*, (§ 3.2.3.) *uncertainty*, and (§ 3.2.4.) *creativity*.

3.2.1. First characteristic: competition

Competition is essential to the development of vital processes, including market processes. For entrepreneurs, the more dynamic and pluralistic the competition is, the more profit opportunities can emerge for an undetermined number of market participants (e.g., benefits are also immaterial and distributed across time). In the realm of (genuine) entrepreneurship, having competition is recognised as intrinsic to the marketplace; it has positive connotations, and it is *co-evolutionary* (also with respect to the wider environment of action, including other peer entrepreneurs, customers and so on).¹³ For members of criminal organisations, the more static and monolithic the competition is, the more criminal profits emerge for a determined number of market participants (e.g., benefits are mainly material and strictly allocated within certain networks). In the realm of crime, having competition is unhelpful to the course of affairs; it has mainly negative connotations.

3.2.2. Second characteristic: alertness

Alertness can be understood as the mental readiness required to gain competitive advantages from external events. Entrepreneurs are eager to spot opportunities for new

¹³ For the wider debates on the benefits of entrepreneurial competition, see, for instance, Lavoie (2005), Fuller and Warren (2006), De Soto (2008), Stam and Lambooy (2012), Bertaud (2018) and Tavassoli et al. (2021).

ideas to meet or anticipate new market *demands*. By contrast, criminals devote most of their resources to super-imposing otherwise unnecessary *needs* on societies, invariably sustained by illicit acts (e.g., violence, illegal trafficking). In a similar vein, consider how, in reaction to the abuses of organised crime, individuals must often invest in extra protection for personal security and safeguarding property.¹⁴

3.2.3. Third characteristic: uncertainty

The term *uncertainty* has several meanings, and its usage is not always clear in the entrepreneurial and organised crime literature. Entrepreneurs profit from what can be called *large uncertainty*: a deep acceptance that the outcomes of their actions are beyond their direct control but that the exchange of resources is coordinated and granted by rules both internal and external to the company (e.g., contracts, laws).¹⁵ Criminals profit from the *narrow uncertainty* they impose on a given context. Their actions aim to take control of outcomes, making resource exchanges more predictable on the basis of rules that organised crime illicitly imposes on the outside context. In

¹⁴ On these problems, see Mehlum et al. (2003), Sutter et al. (2013) and Vorley and Williams (2016). We will come back to this issue in Section 4.

¹⁵ The term “large uncertainty” is here used as a synonym for “radical uncertainty” or “fundamental ignorance”, as discussed in von Mises (1949) and von Hayek (1955). For a wider discussion on uncertainty and entrepreneurial actions, see Langlois and Everett (1992), O’Shea and Buckley (2010) and Elert and Henrekson (2021). See also Dold and Stanton (2021).

this scenario, colluding agents are unfree and emptied of their decision-making autonomy.¹⁶

3.2.4. Fourth characteristic: creativity

Creativity can refer to the ability to generate resources that would otherwise not exist. The creative action of an entrepreneur can be described as a constant (re)combination of resources. Entrepreneurial agents require an open mind (and peace of mind) to wonder with imagination. The outcomes of the creative process can be seen as beneficial and satisfying for the entrepreneur, even when unprofitable (from a strictly economic standpoint). Entrepreneurs are often encouraged to be creative in open-ended market processes. By contrast, the creative actions of a criminal agent depend mainly on what resources are already available and can be extracted from the outside context.¹⁷ In criminal schemes, the creative process is more material than intellectual as it is set by rigidly established means. In this sense, pure creativity might be seen as something to be contained and discouraged because the criminal is, and must be, a participant in closed-ended market processes. In sum, while thinking creatively can be very

¹⁶ The concept of narrow uncertainty can have an indirect psychological meaning (e.g., state of apprehension) as fear of organised crime reprisals may severely bind entrepreneurial decisions (Solari, 2007; Scandizzo and Ventura, 2015; La Rosa et al., 2018; Ferrante et al., 2021).

¹⁷ For empirical examples, consider Schelling (1971), Reuters (1983), Wright (2006), Gottschalk (2009), Smith (2009) and McCarthy (2011: 39). For a contrast of the nature and benefits of entrepreneurial creativity, see Lachmann (1986), Chiles et al. (2007), De Soto (2008), Tang (2008) and Gartner (2014).

advantageous for the entrepreneur, a deviation from the original schemes can be highly disadvantageous for the criminal (e.g. risk of exposure).

3.3. *Three (further) necessary shifts: taking entrepreneurship seriously*

Once it is accepted that entrepreneurial activities are extremely different (perhaps *antipodal*) from organised crime activities, further conceptual and practical shifts are required.

3.3.1. A first (theoretical) shift: from the enterprise to the corporatist model of organised crime

Abandoning the inappropriate enterprise model and considering what can be instead called the “corporatist” model of organised crime. That is to bring back attention to the *constitutive elements* of organised crime (e.g., illegality and violence; § 2), leaving little doubt about how deleterious this phenomenon is for societal and economic development. This suggestion can be seen as a step back in organised crime research as the literature has already (perhaps too hastily) dismissed corporatist conceptions of organised crime as too orthodox.¹⁸ Obviously, the term “corporatist” does not allude to

¹⁸ In the literature, the corporatist model is sometimes labelled as conspiratorial, criticised especially by the future proponents of the criminal-entrepreneurial model, such as Smith (1976) and Reuter (1983, 1985). Ironically, the conspiratorial afflatus remains when considering organised crime as “part and parcel of the political, economic system” (Lyman and Potter, 1997: 452). If scholars remain interested in investigating *continuums*

any kind of economic company (e.g., corporations) but to a precise entity marked by authoritative and totalitarian intentions. In this case, it is worth noting that one of the members of the Frankfurt school, Max Horkheimer, believed that *rackets* share many characteristics with fascist corporatism, portrayed as a “fundamental dominion” governing advanced capitalism.¹⁹ By contrast, members of the Austrian school would point out that rackets, precisely because they are corporatist, are far from, and incompatible with, the development of capitalism (advanced or otherwise). Perhaps it is not pure chance that bottom-up crime-fighting associations (especially of entrepreneurs) are often constituted exactly to tackle problems inflicted by *rackets* (La Rosa et al., 2018). As previously highlighted, racketeering and extortion continue feeding a significant portion of criminal markets in all types of economies.

3.3.2. A second (cultural) shift: more entrepreneurial culture than mere culture of legality

As also suggested by Giugni et al. (2018), it would be interesting to enforce a more robust “entrepreneurial culture” than a mere “culture of legality”. This challenge can be directed to both private and public agents, but that would require recognising that

between the upper and the underworlds, these could be stronger, and more concrete, among the relationships between organised crime and terrorism (see also Wright, 2006; Mullins, 2009).

¹⁹ According to some commentators, this theory of rackets was supposed to be included in the last section of the *Dialectic of Illuminism*, but it was not, probably because Adorno did not fully share the ideas of Horkheimer (who published his theory of rackets in a separate publication; see Horkheimer, 1931-1949/1985). See Schulte-Bockholt (2006), Heins (2007) and Granter (2007).

organised crime is primarily a “state failure” (Sung, 2004) more than a “market failure” (Arlacchi, 1983/1986; Volkov, 2002). The collapse of fundamental market mechanisms (e.g., competition, information, property rights) results from organised crime power. Reactory policies (e.g., “command-and-control” approaches) often moralise legality, but how credible can interventions be if corruption also involves public offices?²⁰ The answer is that organised crime problems must be contained, and even prevented, not by having a stronger state but by having stronger social institutions, including freer market exchanges. Therefore, sustaining entrepreneurial activities and an entrepreneurial spirit in society could be a viable option.²¹ In short, public rules

²⁰ In Italy, for instance, the dismissals of local governments for criminal infiltrations may increase social compliance in legal actions (e.g., increases in tax payments) but mainly as an effect of increased controls during official inspections and at the expense of creating more institutional voids and social stigma. See Cingano and Tonello (2020) and Pinotti (2020). A similar discourse emerges for certain legal justice interventions, often causing more damage to the reputations of local communities than to criminals (Lippke, 2011). One may argue that top-down approaches in crime-fighting strategies seem more concerned with saving the reputation of the state than protecting local communities.

²¹ Here, the challenge is not to reward the best, purest or most authentic agent, but any agent willing to explore new *possibilities* to enterprise within their environment (Gartner, 2014). This consideration stems from another critical aspect related to Italy. To access certain funding, it may be required to demonstrate that companies are completely clean or purged from any contact or experience with criminal activity (Law No. 190/2012). This is regarded as a good incentive to increase legal compliance and monitor infiltration activities. The main problem, however, is that these certificates come as a fee (or tax) to be renewed every year, or else the company will be removed from (or simply lose its spot on) the white lists of legal enterprises. It is evident that this scheme is not very appealing, nor particularly rewarding, for entrepreneurs and companies who may continue to prefer more general, freer and indirect ratings (e.g., reliability indexes). Compare with Ayling (2017).

should do anything to make the option of succumbing to crime a less common and less desirable prospect for any social agent over time.²²

3.3.3. A third (practical) shift: strengthening (instead of weakening) private property rights

In organised crime studies, the institution of property (and private property rights in particular) is often misunderstood. Organised crime can allocate, control, grant and protect *certain* property rights; however, in whichever way one wishes to frame it, organised crime is not safeguarding any type of property rights except *its own*.²³ This is not because criminal groups pursue a form of “utilitarian individualism” (Light, 1977: 467) or an “individualistic predatory philosophy” (Lindesmith, 1941; Gottschalk, 2009). Actually, one could provocatively say the opposite: all the actions of organised crime are by definition enacted for collectivistic purposes; the only regard for individualistic aspects is that organised crime assumes that any person, including non-members, should pay a tribute to sustain *the organisation*.²⁴ As is evident where organised crime operates as a well-established force, the depressive effects on local

²² Following the idea of a *content-independent interest in freedom* put forth by Carter (2014: 95), “the anti-paternalist move can be completed either by rejecting all reference to specific capabilities, or by combining an interest in specific capabilities with an interest in freedom as such.”

²³ As McCarthy (2011: 25) observes, “When organized crime groups participate in wholly illegal activities or transactions that partake of major elements of illegality, I am not so sure that private property rights are uppermost in their minds. To paraphrase an old saying, in these situations possession is not just nine-tenths of the law, but ten-tenths”. Compare with Skarbek (2010: 185) and Champeyrache (2018).

²⁴ Compare Banfield (1958) with von Hayek (1948).

markets are pervasive and visible, especially in the property markets.²⁵ Even well-intended public policies risk weakening private property rights when they should instead be sustained more. For instance, in Italy, certain public rules prevent the private sector from using or purchasing assets confiscated from mafia groups.²⁶ Leaving these assets unchanged, they can be perceived as miserable (criminal) monuments. However, these rules assume that the private market is a more efficient conduit than others for feeding criminal profits, even despite the evidence that criminal infiltrations are also present, and more problematically, in many public and non-profit activities. Note also that many comparative studies show that organised crime infiltrates relatively less in innovative, knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g., Information and Communication Technology) and more in protected, labour-intensive sectors that are often linked to public tender and governmental subsidies.²⁷

²⁵ As evidenced by Sung (2004), Buscaglia (2008b), Savona and Berlusconi (2015) and Ferrante et al. (2021).

²⁶ These properties lie mostly empty and unused, especially in regions historically tamed by traditional crime, but there are also many that are present in more entrepreneurial regions. Based on the analyses of Mocetti and Rizzica (2023), 70% of confiscated properties in Italy are in southern regions, while the 30% are in northern regions. On this topic, see also Faldetta and Provenzano (2016), Calamunci and Drago (2020) and Ferrante et al. (2021).

²⁷ The varieties of protected areas infiltrated by crime in Italy include management of asylum seeker facilities (carried out also by semi-public and non-governmental organisations and agencies) (Luca and Proietti, 2022), land use planning processes and permissions (Chiodelli, 2019; Bertolin and Chiodelli, 2023; see also Beare, 2007) and large-scale projects on renewable energy plants (Checchi and Polo, 2020). See also Savona and Berlusconi (2015) and Ferrante et al. (2021: 1463).

4. Discussion

4.1. Summing up

In the literature, the characteristics of competition, alertness, uncertainty and creativity are often (and inappropriately) framed merely in relation to the *instrumental rationality* of economic agents. In this paper, these characteristics are instead interpreted in light of their enterprising qualities (see Tab. 1).

Table 1 | Distinction between entrepreneurial and criminal actions based on four characteristics

Types of actions	Competition	Alertness	Uncertainty	Creativity
Entrepreneurial action	Co-evolutionary, honest, dynamic, pluralistic	Catching up with emerging market <i>demands</i> (e.g., goods and services)	Benefits from the <i>large uncertainty</i> of social and environmental interactions	Encouraged, munificent, open-ended (e.g., innovative, imaginative, non-deterministic, redundant, diversified)
Criminal action	Predatory, exploitative, static, antagonistic, hostile, monopolistic	Finding ways of imposing market <i>needs</i> (e.g., extra protection, illicit trafficking)	Benefits from the <i>narrow uncertainty</i> of social and environmental interactions	Discouraged, expropriative, closed-ended (e.g., replicative, rationalised, deterministic, low differentiation)

For what regards competition, it is commonly held that organised crime damages or negatively alters market competition (and social processes at large) through illicit means (e.g., violence, corruption); however, scholars do not always take a clear position on such matters. Only a few authors emphasise the low tolerance of organised crime towards competition *as such*, and that being part of criminal monopolies logically implies a withdrawal from free market processes. It should always be clear that criminal competition ultimately aims to exclude, suppress and destroy other

groups, disregarding all desirable principles governing social exchanges.²⁸ In the words of von Mises, organised crime imposes a “policy of violence” (as opposed to a “policy of contract”), under which the “Law of the Stronger” acts as the negation of the “Law” (von Mises, 1951: 69). By adopting this perspective, even the relationship between licit and illicit activities (e.g., money laundering) can be interpreted more as an *interruption* than a *continuum* of (actual) entrepreneurial activities. Note that markets controlled by organised crime are less competitive also because local entrepreneurs may refrain from expanding (sometimes even registering) their activities to maintain a low profile and escape the criminal radar. When entrepreneurs lend themselves to criminal organisations (e.g. pay for protection, offer services for the organisation), the enterprise no longer pursues substantial legal purposes—it dramatically changes its *status*.²⁹ In this case, the rules of the game (including means and purposes of competition) are inevitably distorted and fundamentally changed to make crime and entrepreneurialism substantially *incompatible*. Here, it is important to underscore that the problems most directly affecting entrepreneurs (e.g., extortion and racketeering) still largely characterise criminal markets in all types of economies worldwide.³⁰ These types of

²⁸ On these problems, see Light (1977), Catanzaro (1994), Finckenauer (2005), Kleemans (2007) and Starbeck (2010).

²⁹ On these problems, see Liddick (1999), Masciandaro (2000: 274), Finckenauer (2005: 71), Savona and Berlusconi (2015), Mallon and Fainshmidt (2022) and Bertolin and Chiodelli (2023).

³⁰ Thus, extortion and racketeering have the largest scores in *criminal markets* in Colombia (8.50), South Africa (8.0, the same score for arms trafficking) and Italy (7.50, the same score for human smuggling). The situation is particularly dramatic in Nigeria, where high levels of extortion and racketeering (8.0, as for trade of counterfeit goods and after arms trafficking: 8.5) correspond to very low levels of personal autonomy and

extraordinary problems can be further exacerbated by poor institutional performance in more ordinary affairs, such as protecting economic and individual rights and liberties (see Tab. 2).

Table 2 | Contry ranking and comparisons between criminal, economic and freedom indexes

Global Organised Crime Index (2023)					World Bank (2020)		Freedom Index (2023)		
Selected countries*	Criminality	Resilience to crime	Criminal markets	Criminal actors	Ease of doing business	Starting a business	Political rights rating	Civil liberties rating	Freedom classification
China	33	49	24	46	32	45	7	6	Not Free
Colombia	2	50	5	4	67	95	2	3	Free
Costa Rica	72	50	67	68	74	144	1	1	Free
France	58	27	44	68	33	36	1	2	Free
Italy	40	31	50	30	58	98	1	1	Free
Malaysia	38	40	18	66	12	126	4	4	Partly Free
Nigeria	6	45	3	19	131	105	4	5	Partly Free
Senegal	73	45	59	79	123	60	3	3	Partly Free
South Africa	7	50	10	10	84	139	2	2	Free
Spain	54	28	53	48	31	97	1	1	Free
United Kingdom	61	12	60	53	8	18	1	1	Free
United States	67	24	47	79	6	55	2	2	Free

*The countries selected correspond to the ones ranking highest in both the criminality and (crime) resilience indexes (as in the Global Organised Crime Index, 2023; see Annex).

The characteristic of alertness can be understood as a peculiarly entrepreneurial trait. Cunningham and Lischeron (1991) place alertness in the “entrepreneurial school of entrepreneurship”, but it can also be found in organised crime literature, even if it is mostly understood in Schumpeterian terms (i.e., instrumental to creative actions). Here, the discussion adopts the original Kirznerian idea of alertness, as something related to

individual rights. See the Global Organised Crime Index (2023) and the Freedom Index (2023). See also the Annex.

the sensible receptiveness of the agent (preceding and underlining any act), as the ability to catch empirical information more than the ability to use it directly (Kirzner, 1979, 1997). Genuine entrepreneurs (as any agents) require some peace of mind to be effective and productive. Peaceful economic agents have a positive attitude towards contextual changes, which is also essential to spot competitive advantages in the market (Baumol, 2003; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). This can happen in ordinary situations until *narrow uncertainty* sets in.

Narrow uncertainty can push entrepreneurs to adopt irrational behaviours (e.g., giving up certain profits), but the point here is to stress their lack of spontaneity as organised crime shrinks the space for genuine social exchanges. From this perspective, even corruption problems *cannot be equated to utility maximisation evaluations*. Under the threat of violence (factual or menaced), people cannot be considered free to make decisions (La Rosa et al., 2018: 30). As also evidenced by the characteristic of competition, criminal actions are largely connotated by strong boundaries, protectionist attitudes and closure. Criminal organisations make any transaction cost more predictable (Gottschalk, 2009: 98). Even when sophisticated, the uses of alertness are more limited than what entrepreneurs do in licit marketplaces (Southerland and Potter, 1993; Liddick, 1999). When criminal profits emerge, they are allocated in a top-down manner within criminal circuits. Paraphrasing von Mises (1947), it could be said that organised crime creates “planned chaos” that systematically erodes social values (McCaffrey, 2018: 197). This is particularly evident where organised crime power is territorially based, where environmental information can also be distorted by the effect of resource control and price manipulation. In considering the results from the two

different types of creativity, we can say that organised crime mainly creates “artificial scarcity” (Champeyrache, 2018, 2022), while entrepreneurial activities (when adequately sustained) may result in “environmental munificence” (Tang, 2008).

4.2. *Critical remarks*

In areas tamed by organised crime, entrepreneurs direct parts of their profits for the extra protection of their activities because they feel unprotected by formal or official agencies. Citizens may feel compelled to adopt various strategies to protect their lives and property, for instance, hiring private guards or installing security cameras. In many cases, extra protection is a logical and often inescapable solution, but the point is to underline that these decisions are violence induced and reactive to the erosion of the rule of law (Mocetti and Rizzica, 2023). In many cases, enhancing public order may be costly and not always effective, but physically agglomerating entrepreneurial activities may be a viable indirect solution. As suggested by Sutter et al. (2013: 753), problems of intense competition may be offset by security advantages. Additional measures should be taken. Scandizzo and Ventura (2015) interestingly suggest that enhancing the protection and secrecy of legal market transactions can be useful to increase uncertainty and confine organised crime in an “inaction zone”. Enhancing the density and proximity of legal economic activities can be useful for sustaining the *large uncertainty* that is ostracised by criminals and useful for entrepreneurs. Abandoning the traditional approach to land use development and zoning (which tends to favour the differentiated instalment of large compounds of mainly monofunctional activities, such

as industrial, commercial and residential areas) could also be useful to contain opportunities for crime infiltration in spatial planning processes (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2015). As argued by Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995: 129), “Successful collusion makes it almost impossible for outsiders even to contemplate entering an industry, and overt intimidation becomes redundant. This is why the enforcement of internal agreements is much more important than the brutal discouragement of rivals”. The authors believe that “the lack of entrepreneurial energy” is a less important factor, but this energy depends in large part on the ability to attract and retain workforces (Guerci et al., 2021). As McCaffrey (2018: 189) rightly observes, theorists assume that entrepreneurship is constant, including those who may consider organised crime as a destructive type of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). As noted by other authors, the destructive effects of organised crime power also – if not especially – manifest themselves in the erosion of future entrepreneurial talents. Taking these aspects seriously, the relationship between organised crime and out-migration patterns can also be understood in very different ways.³¹ Note that even problems of self-censorship, or accepting extortions (e.g., paying the “pizzo”), *cannot be seen as a form of full compliance or acceptance with criminal codes*; instead, it is the signal of failures in the dimension of personal liberties, both civic and economic. Thus, the public problem of entrepreneurs relinquishing their autonomy is that this renouncement is the ultimate expression of distrust in institutions

³¹ As suggested by Champeyrache (2018: 162), “sterilization of entrepreneurial potentialities and migration of talents are evidence of the destructive power of mafia entrepreneurship in territories ruled by the criminal association” (see also Arlacchi, 1983/1986; Champeyrache, 2014). Compare also with Light (1977), Wright (2006), Ayling (2017) and Luca and Proietti (2022).

(both in terms of general rules of conduct and mistrust in official authorities). Based on the Global Organized Crime Index (2023), it seems that state-embedded actors remain the most pervasive type of criminal actor at the global average and that 62% of the world population lives in countries with low resilience to crime (i.e., poor legislative and political frameworks to combat crime).³²

4.3. Policy implications

Entrepreneurial processes are sensitive to the quality of formal institutions (e.g., law, public rules).

In general terms, stricter adherence to the rule of law, a more effective and reliable judicial system, and the elimination of ineffective forms of welfare based on arbitrary and discretionary access criteria are required.³³

More specifically, in the fight against organised crime, policymakers should also consider fostering, instead of straightjacketing, genuine entrepreneurial endeavours in all possible ways. First, this can be accomplished by reducing bureaucracy, especially

³² See Annex, Table A. On these problems, see also Mehlum et al. (2003), Wright (2006), Gottschalk (2009), McCarthy (2011), Elert and Henrekson (2021) and Chemperiache (2022).

³³ On these aspects, see e.g. Buscaglia (2008a), Vaccaro & Palazzo (2015), Volery & Williams (2016), Ayling (2017), Ferrante et al. (2021).

concerning the acquisition and registration of property,³⁴ access to credit³⁵ and the enforcement of contracts.³⁶ In short, the entrepreneurial context must be made more complex (not complicated) to let entrepreneurs gain competitive advantages (Langlois and Everett, 2007; Hindle, 2010; Moroni, 2012).

Second, and in parallel, it is important to reduce operative costs for running legal businesses, especially income taxes.³⁷ Criminal business is extremely advantaged from a fiscal point of view compared to legal business. Organised crime does not pay taxes, and it imposes its own crime tariffs on all other market participants (Southerland and Potter, 1993: 262).

³⁴ Regarding property, in Nigeria both the time and the costs to register private property are much higher compared to the other selected countries in Tab. 1 (specifically 91 days against an average of 25,82 days, and costs are 11.3% of the property value against an average of 5.41%). See Annex, Table B. This aspect becomes more critical when observing the low scores on the indexes on the quality of land administration (7.97, av. 19.54), reliability of infrastructure (4.8, av. 6.1), transparency (1.39, av. 3.71) and land dispute resolutions (2.5, av. 5.65). See more data from the World Bank (2020).

³⁵ The ease of obtaining credit can differ significantly depending on context, but what is worth underlining that it can be particularly difficult in high-income countries (e.g., Spain, France, Italy), upper middle-income countries (e.g., China, South Africa) and lower middle-income countries (e.g., Senegal). The same countries that rank poorly in obtaining credit are also less performative in the strengths of legal rights index; in ascendant order, they are Italy, China, France, South Africa, Spain and Senegal (World Bank, 2020).

³⁶ In the lower positions in the ranking of enforcing contracts, we find Nigeria (73), South Africa (102), Costa Rica (111), Italy (122), Senegal (132) and Colombia (177). Remarkably, Italy and Colombia also have the highest number of days for enforcing contracts (respectively, 1,120 days in Italy and 1,288 days in Colombia against an average of 500–600 days) and days of trial and judgment (840 in Italy and 855 in Colombia against an average of 400–300 days). See Annex, Table B.

³⁷ Note that among the twelve selected countries (in Tab. 1), labour taxes are particularly high, absorbing half of entrepreneurial profits, such as in France (50%), but also in China (46.2%) and Italy (42.9%). For the same countries, the total taxes on profits remain among the highest (China 60.7%, France 59.2% and Italy 59.1%), together with Colombia (71.2%) and Costa Rica (58.3%). See Annex, Table B.

Third, densifying areas for enterprises (e.g., creating economic clusters) may also generate positive spillover and pose more problems for criminals. As organised crime has no tolerance for competition – especially concerning non-criminal agencies – it can be assumed that wider audiences mean it is more costly to control territory. Or, as Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995: 129) put it, the greater the number of firms, the harder it becomes to ensure that they all keep their word.

Fourth, it is necessary to achieve greater efficiency in economies of scale (Stam and Lambooy, 2012; Mack and Mayer, 2015). This challenge also calls for a radical rethink of the development of the reference territory: diversifying economic activities implies making the market more pluralistic and decentralised. A more organic development approach favouring small incremental developments, allowing more mixed use in local areas (not only in urban centres but also in peri-urban and rural localities), could help make the contextual setting richer in opportunities and stimulating for legal agents.

Clearly, as previously emphasised (§ 3.3), all the aforementioned measures will have a greater chance of success if accompanied by profound cultural and social shifts.

5. Conclusions

This paper explores how currently dominant interpretative models of organised crime are too limited and should be superseded. Criticisms of the criminal-entrepreneurial model in organised crime research are not new in the debate (Liddick, 1999; Finckenauer, 2005; Masciandaro, 2000; Kleemans, 2013), but many authors do not

necessarily dismiss or even directly challenge the very attribution of entrepreneurial characteristics to organised crime. Instead, this paper started by adopting the conception of the economic agent as framed by the Austrian school of economics, which is rarely taken into consideration in organised crime research but is widely adopted in entrepreneurial research.³⁸

In this light, criminal and entrepreneurial elements were confronted based on four main characteristics of human actions (i.e., competition, alertness, uncertainty and creativity). The resulting discussion suggests the following. As regards *competition*, while acknowledging that profits may be a point for any economic agent, it is evident that the means and the ends are profoundly different between criminals and entrepreneurs. As regards the characteristic of *alertness*, criminals impose needs by altering local information (manipulating prices, access to and quality of local resources), while entrepreneurs search for new demands by recombining information (exalting local values often by pure chance). Additionally, for these reasons, criminal actions prefer what this paper calls *narrow uncertainty*, while entrepreneurs gain an advantage from *large uncertainty*. In relation to *creativity* (and creative acts), criminal creativity appears now as a toned-down version of the general concept of creativity.

In short, the characteristics of entrepreneurial and criminal actions seem profoundly different and even *incompatible*. This conclusion may find resistance for many reasons, including certain deep biases (e.g., ideological) regarding market

³⁸ See especially Desrochers (2001), Chiles et al. (2007) and De Soto (2008). Compare also with Tang (2008), Hindle (2010), Bjørnskov and Foss (2012), Stam and Lambooy (2012), Gartner (2014), McCaffrey (2015, 2018) and Elert and Henrekson (2021).

processes. Effectively, in organised crime research, the long-standing assumption is that the freer the market (or the more *laissez-faire*), the more negative processes (including organised crime) have the chance to emerge.³⁹ One can challenge this assumption by engaging in further cultural shifts, but the central message is that policymakers can enhance the effectiveness of crime-fighting strategies with more entrepreneurial-friendly mindsets. The policy suggestions here advanced assume that reducing bureaucracy and fiscal obligations, enhancing security by physical proximity and stimulating entrepreneurship through land use mixes can exert spontaneous control mechanisms that could be complementary to more direct crime-fighting strategies. Many studies demonstrate how supporting a variety and plurality of economic and civil liberties is essential to emerge from marginal situations (e.g., poverty, stagnation) in various areas of the world (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2012; Bruton et al., 2013; Bennett, 2020). This path can start from a more active interest in the figure and virtue of the entrepreneurial agent, also endowed with values (and senses of justice) that are anything but secondary to the discourse (Greenberg, 1986). An obvious objection is that collaborative attitudes may change in particularly wide and/or culturally diverse social contexts, but further empirical investigations may corroborate the suggestions here advanced.

Future research could explore how sponsoring and sustaining an entrepreneurial culture could also push public authorities (e.g., local administrations) to become more focused on the investment in crucial public amenities (avoiding infiltrations when sub-

³⁹ Compare Lindesmith (1941), Smith (1976, 1980), Light (1977), Wright (2006) and Naylor (2009).

letting public works)⁴⁰ to encourage private investments in local markets. This solution does not demonstrate the strength of the state but rather reassures the basic institutional reputation before crime infiltrates, not only in extraordinary affairs, but, more importantly, even in simpler and more ordinary ones.

The policy suggestions of this paper openly aim to enforce an entrepreneurial spirit in society. These are suggested as an indirect measure to the fight against organised crime, as well as a way to compensate for the limits that more direct measures may have. Policymakers willing to protect crucial social institutions, such as those of free markets and the rule of law, may do so by sustaining the entrepreneurial spirit of communities oppressed by the power of crime. This can be possible only by accepting a sharp separation of criminal from entrepreneurial phenomena and viewing entrepreneurs not as potentially complicit actors or victims but as principal allies in this fight.

⁴⁰ See Chubb (1981), Catanzaro (1994), Finckenaue (2005), Canonico et al. (2012), FATF (2016) and Champeyrache (2018).

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Annex

Table A – From: Global Organised Crime Index (2023)

Global Organised Crime Index (2023) High-Crime, High-resilience countries	Criminal markets				Criminal actors						Resilience					
	Rank	Extortion / racketeering	Trade of counterfeit goods	illicit trade in excisable goods	Rank	Score	Mafia-style	Criminal networks	State-embedded	Private sector	Rank	Score	Political leadership and governance	Government transparency and accountability	International cooperaton	National policies and laws
China	24	5.00	9.50	6.00	46	6.20	6.50	7.50	7.00	7.00	49	5.67	6.00	4.00	6.00	7.50
Colombia	5	8.50	7.50	4.50	4	8.20	9.50	9.50	7.50	7.00	50	5.63	6.00	5.50	9.00	6.50
Costa Rica	67	6.00	5.50	6.00	68	5.70	7.00	6.00	2.50	6.00	50	5.63	7.00	6.50	6.50	6.50
France	44	4.50	7.00	5.50	68	5.70	6.00	6.50	3.50	5.50	27	6.96	6.50	7.00	8.50	7.50
Italy	50	7.50	5.50	4.00	30	6.70	9.00	3.50	6.50	7.00	31	6.46	6.50	5.00	9.00	8.00
Malaysia	18	5.50	7.50	7.00	66	5.80	4.50	5.50	6.00	6.00	40	5.92	4.50	5.50	7.00	7.50
Nigeria	3	8.00	8.00	7.00	19	7.20	5.50	8.50	7.50	7.00	45	5.79	5.50	5.00	7.50	7.50
Senegal	59	4.50	7.50	6.00	79	5.50	3.00	6.00	5.00	7.00	45	5.79	5.50	5.00	7.00	6.50
South Africa	10	8.00	7.00	7.00	10	7.50	7.50	8.00	8.00	6.50	50	5.63	5.50	5.50	6.00	7.00
Spain	53	4.00	6.00	6.50	48	6.10	6.00	7.00	5.00	5.00	28	6.75	6.50	6.00	8.50	8.00
United Kingdom	60	6.00	6.50	6.00	53	6.00	4.50	7.00	3.50	7.50	12	7.54	7.50	6.50	7.50	8.00
United States	47	3.00	6.00	5.00	79	5.50	5.50	6.00	4.50	6.00	24	7.13	6.00	6.00	9.00	6.50

Table B – From: World Bank (2020) *DB15-20 methodology

Global Organised Crime Index (2023) High-Crime, High-resilience countries	Ease of doing business		Starting a business		Dealing with construction permits			Registering property			Getting credit			Paying taxes					Enforcing contracts			
	Rank	Rank	Rank	Cost (% of Warehouse value)	Rank	Time (days)	Cost (% of property value)	Rank	Score - Strength of legal rights index (0-12) *	Score- Strength of legal rights index (0-12) *	Rank	Total tax and contribution rate (% of profit)	Profit tax (% of profit)	Labor tax and contributions (% of profit)	Other taxes (% of profit)	Rank-Enforcing contracts	Time (days)	Trial and judgment (days)	Enforcement of judgment (days)			
China	32	45	33	2.80	28	9.00	4.60	92	3.00	25.00	105	59.20	6.30	46.20	6.80	5	496.25	223.50	240.00			
Colombia	67	95	89	6.90	62	15.00	2.00	11	11.00	91.67	148	71.20	21.10	23.60	26.60	177	1288.00	855.00	365.00			
Costa Rica	74	144	78	2.00	49	11.00	3.40	15	10.00	83.33	66	58.30	19.20	32.70	6.40	111	852.00	547.00	260.00			
France	33	36	52	3.90	99	42.00	7.30	104	4.00	33.33	60	60.70	0.20	50.00	10.50	17	447.00	325.00	100.00			
Italy	58	98	97	3.40	26	16.00	4.40	119	2.00	16.67	128	59.10	14.60	42.90	1.60	122	1120.00	840.00	270.00			
Malaysia	12	126	2	1.30	33	11.50	3.50	37	7.00	58.33	80	38.70	19.60	16.70	2.50	35	425.00	270.00	120.00			
Nigeria	131	105	55	4.00	183	91.66	11.30	15	9.00	75.00	159	34.80	21.00	13.50	0.30	73	399.00	233.33	130.04			
Senegal	123	60	131	7.80	116	41.00	7.10	67	6.00	50.00	166	44.80	16.20	23.60	5.00	132	650.00	300.00	315.00			
South Africa	84	139	98	1.90	108	23.00	8.00	80	5.00	41.67	54	29.20	21.80	4.00	3.40	102	600.00	490.00	80.00			
Spain	31	97	79	4.70	59	13.00	6.10	80	5.00	41.67	34	47.00	10.60	35.80	0.70	27	510.00	280.00	180.00			
United Kingdom	8	18	23	1.10	41	21.50	4.80	37	7.00	58.33	27	30.60	16.60	12.00	2.00	34	437.00	345.00	62.00			
United States	6	55	24	0.70	39	15.20	2.40	4	11.00	91.67	25	36.60	20.70	9.80	6.10	18	444.00	314.00	100.00			

Table C – From: Freedom Index (2023)

Global Organised Crime Index (2023)	Freedom index		Freedom index ratings		Political Pluralism and Participation		Functioning of Government			Rule of Law			Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights	
	Status		Political Rights rating	Civil Liberties rating	B3 Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	C2 Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	C3 Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	F2 Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	F3 Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	F4 Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	G2 Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	G4 Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?		
China	Not Free		7	6	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	2		
Colombia	Free		2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2		
Costa Rica	Free		1	1	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	3		
France	Free		1	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	4	3		
Italy	Free		1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		
Malaysia	Partly Free		4	4	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	1		
Nigeria	Partly Free		4	5	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1		
Senegal	Partly Free		3	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	3	2		
South Africa	Free		2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	3	2		
Spain	Free		1	1	4	3	3	3	4	3	4	3		
United Kingdom	Free		1	1	4	3	4	3	3	3	4	3		
United States	Free		2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	3		